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PART TWO
Private Law
CONFLICT OF LAWS*
DAVID S. STERN**
I NTRODUCTION
Viewed from a sufficient distance' the last two years have worked
few basic changes in the Conflict of Laws. It has become increasingly
clear that the tendency of each local unit to assert greater power is intensify-
ing, and the legislative activity in Florida is typical. The need for clarification
of national and international aspects of the field has been stated and will
undoubtedly receive greater recognition in the period before us. At the
same time as they assert greater power, the states seem to have accepted
the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States with regard to
full faith and credit, but the Court itself seems to hesitate before certain
critical problems in the jurisdiction for divorce field and the erosion of
the federal jurisdiction by the extended Erie rule.2
THE EXERCISE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS JURISDICTION
Legislative jurisdiction-recent legislation.-The 1955 Florida Legislature
was very active in extending the authority of laws of this jurisdiction to,
and possibly beyond, the constitutionally permissible limits. Fundamental
* This is the second in the Survey of Florida Law series and covers the cases
contained in Volumes 69 So.2d 1 (1954) through 81 So.2d 696 (Aug. 25, 1955); 4
Fla. Supp. 1 (1953) through 6 Fla. Supp. 200 (1955) and the changes made in the
Florida Statutes by the General Laws of 1955. It also reviews the federal cases in the
Fifth Circuit and certain of the relevant cases from the Supreme Court of the United
States and other jurisdictions. For a general background the reader should utilize the
first article in this series, 8 NIIANtI L.Q. 209 (1954), cited hereinafter simply as 1SURy. FLA. L. 209. Where a new area has been touched by decision or statute, back-
ground material outside of the time limitation will be included; if the court has merely
decided a case following a rule already commented on, reference will be made to the
prior article.
•* Professor of Law and Director, Inter-American Law Program, University of
Miami School of Law.
1. Sufficient in this case to lend detachment as well as enchantment. The
final research for this article was done, and the text of this article was written while
the author was on leave as lecturer in Comparative Law at the Law School of the
University of Guadalajara, Mexico.
2. For example, see Republic of Indonesia v. J. R. Simplot Co., 220 F 2d
321 (9th Cir. 1955) wherein the court avoided the destruction of diversity jurisdiction
under Woods v. Interstate Realty doctrine (Idaho refused use of state courts to un-
qualifed foreign corporations) by finding interstate commerce present, 337 U.S. 535
(1949).
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to this subject is the cxclusive applicability of laws within the territory
of the sovereign and, taking advantage of Congressional enabling legislation,
the State of Florida now has, in part, new boundaries.3 Within the territory,
another statute4 permits the change in character of part of that territory
by granting the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center authority to
make application to the proper federal authorities for the designation of a
foreign-trade zone within the Center. The emergence of this center,
especially with its avowed aims to increase trade between the hemispheres,
will bring numerous conflict and foreign law problems to the jurisdiction.
A new Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law was enacted.
Jurisdiction over non-residents, as defined in the act, is presumed throughout
the act.6  The commissioner is given authority to enter reciprocal agree-
ments7 with other states whereby licenses of residents involved in an acci-
dent in such states may be revoked and the other penalties of the law
invoked. In the second subsection the legislature assumes to exercise the
same authority over non-residents as over residents, for accidents in the
state. This language is included:
In the event such nonresident shall at the time have in effect
an insurance policy or surety bond issued by an insurance company
or surety company not authorized to do business in this state, the
commissioner may reinstate such nonresident upon said company
furnishing him with power of attorney to accept service of process.8
It is assumed that the "him" in the last clause refers to the com-
missioner and not the non-resident. When it is remembered that the
stringent penalties of this new act operate to include every accident causing
3. Laws of Fla., c. 29744 (1955) under authority of Pub.L. No. 31, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (May 22, 1953), which defines the new boundary as a line three geographical
miles from the coast line along the Atlantic Ocean and Florida straits. "Coast line"
is defined in the same chapter as the "line of ordinary low-water along that portion
of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line of ordinary
low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea
and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters."
4. Laws of Fla., c. 29828 (1955) adding a new section (554.28) to the chapter
dealing with the Authority.
5. Laws of Fla., c. 29963 (1955) adding a new chapter FLA.. STAT. § 324(1953).
New section 324.01, sub § 5 defines a non-resident as "every person who is not a
resident of the state" and does not bother to explain what it means, since the statute
in general assumes jurisdiction over everyone; in its sub § 10, "judgment" includes
any final judgment of any state or of the United States.
6. See as examples §§ 324.10-13.
7. By new section 324.06 the use of reciprocal agreements is becoming a favorite
legislative device of which the Support of Dependents Act is a very well known example,
former law Ch, 88, FLA. STAT. 1953, see comment I Suv. FLA. L. 211 and 223 note
74, now superseded by Laws of Fla., c. 29901 (1955),' Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
mient of Support Act; see also Laws of Fla.. c. 29768 (1955) amending FLA. STAr.
§ 443.18(1)(a) (1953) to limit coverage of reciprocal arrangements for unemployment
compensation of multistate workers; and reciprocal aspects of admission to professions,
Laws of Fla., c. 29727 (1955), pertaining to architects and c. 29846 requiring a non-
resident optometrist to file earlier and pay a double fee; and cf. c. 29983 pertaining to
brokers and amending FLA. STAT. § 475.14 (1953) to make non-active status available
only to residents where formerly open to any broker.
8. FLA. STAT. § 324.06 (2) (1953).
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property damagc of over $50, it will bc scc how popular this jurisdiction,
already rather unpopular for other reasons, will become with insurance
companies abroad."
The Adoption of An Adult Act was amended to remove the require-
ment that the adopter must have had custody of the adoptee for five years
during the latter's infancy. 10 The new Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act' contains more liberal provisions with regard to similarity,
and more stringent penalties for rendition of non-supporters. It continues
essentially the same choice of law rule in Section 8 thereof, as was contained
in the former act.12
Two new statutes' 3 fix time limitations on mortgages and judgment
liens at twenty years. The balance of the legislative action will be con-
sidered in the next section and in the section on judicial jurisdiction when
dealing with the meaning and use of the terms "residence," "permanent
residence," and "domicile."1 4
Legislative jurisdiction-foreign and alien insurance companies.-In view
of the already formidable special regulation of the insurance industry and
admitted characteristics giving the states special interest in that regulation,",
the matters dealing with it have been set apart, as it no longer conforms
to the traditional limitations on state legislative jurisdiction. 8 Five statutes, 17
in addition to the one already noted above, affect this industry exclusively-
numerous other acts have an incidental effect.' 8
9. Mention of "abroad" calls to mind another new act. This is Laws of Fla.,
c. 29629 (1955) which by its Section 3 amends FLA. STAT. § 631.16(1) (1953) so
as to exempt from licensing requirements any alien insurer "owned, controlled, or operated
for a foreign government or any agency thereof."
10. Laws of Fla., c. 29704 (1955) by amending FLA. STAT. § 72.34 (1953).
See comment on this act, I Suav. FLA. L. 211 note 8.
11. Laws of Fla., c. 29901 (1955). It is unfortunate that the drafters did not
include in the definition of "state' , in section 3, language mentioning The Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, which might be excluded by the phraseology used: "state, terri-
tory or possession." Such discrimination, the author is certain, was not intended.
12. The old Act, Ch. 88, FLA. STAT. (1953) was enforced by Pennsylvania
in Comm. ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Sup. 100, 103 A.2d 430 (1954).
13. As to judgment liens, see Laws of Fla., c. 29954 (1955); as to mortgages
a somewhat more complex provision c. 29977 (1955), amending FLA. STAT. 95.28(1953). In advance of both provisions, the court had reached a similar construction
with regard to the duty of support in Isaacs v. Deutsch, 80 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
The rationale of new FLA. STAT. § 95.28 (1955) is based on the holding of H.K.L.
Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954) and enacts much of its language.
14. Attention should be called to one provision extremely beneficial to the law
schools, professors and students. This is Laws of Fla., c. 29736 (1955) adding to
FLA. STAT. § 16.501 (1953) providing for free distribution of the Florida Statutes.
15. See especially discussion in I SURV. FLA. L. 210-213 and notes 5, 12, 18-21.
16. This is particularly true after the decision in the so-called Louisiana direct-
action cases, Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954)
and Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 48 (19541.
17. They are Laws of Fla., cc. 29641, 29680, 29730, 29857 and 29859 (1955),
18. Such as Laws of Fla., c. 29855 (1955) (new form of notice of bankruptcy
to policy-holders), c. 29640 (insurance adjusters) and the New Motorists Financial
Responsibility Act, supra note 5, cc. 29731 and 29733 (group insurance), c. 29732(establishing a new standard life policy). See also cc. 29854, 29856-29858.
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The first'9 presents no special problem. It provides a method for
the domestication of an alien insurer in the state. It seems a reasonable
exercise of the police power to protect domestic insurers from a possible
plea of sovereign immunity. The second20 is what might be termed a
"special penal reciprocal insurance company type" statute. Its purpose
is to require the same treatment of foreign and alien companies doing
business in Florida as the foreign states would require of Florida companies
admitted or being admitted to do business in those states. The most
interesting part of this statute is contained in Section 2 which presumes
the domicile of the company to be in "a state designated by it" wherein it
has its principal office, largest amount of assets, or is admitted to do busi-
ness-except to companies incorporated in Canada, which are deemed
domiciled therein.21  The third22 is another reciprocal penal type act
involving the prohibition on Florida companies from acting in states which
by reciprocity prohibit their companies from acting in Florida without
authorization to do business. An interesting provision is Section 6(a) which
excerpts from the blanket prohibition contracts made where the insured is
present in a state where the company in question is authorized to do
business. 23 By the fourth,24 all policies or certificates in the event of group
coverage tied in with the sale of property (unspecified) in the state are
made subject to Florida law.25  The fifth is another reciprocity statute
permitting the licensing of non-residents as life insurance agents provided
the state wherein the person resides grants the same priviliges "to a citizen"
of Florida. 26 The curious shift in language will be discussed in the section
on the semantics of localizing language in residence statutes.
Juridicial jurisdiction-in general.-Two cases construed the Uniform
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act 21 and destroyed to a very large extent
the progressive construction formerly given that statute. The first was
Lanigan v. Lanigan.21 Action was brought by WI against H and W3. WI
was a resident of Rhode Island and sought to set aside a prior Nevada
divorce obtained some 16 years earlier by H and to obtain satisfaction
of a Rhode Island judgment for arrearages in support based on a Rhode
Island separate maintenance decree prior in time to the Nevada divorce.
WI alleged that the third modification of the support decree was obtained
19. Laws of Fla., c. 29641 (1955).
20. Laws of Fla., c. 29680 (1955).
21. No detailed commentary is made on the effects of this act in view of the
commentary thereon in the Insurance Article in this Survey.
22. Laws of Fla., c. 29730 (1955).
23. Section 6 contains three other saving clauses for insurance to be written in
group, pension, or retirement plans and for renewal of existing business.
24. Laws of Fla., c. 29857 (1955).
25. This statute contains "Isle of Tobago," (see comment infra. note 141,)
language when it states "which coverage is issued in this state or any other state or
country." Verily the laws of Florida do now command the world
26. Laws of Fla., c. 29859 (1955).
27. FLA. STAT. § 92.031 (1953) and see reference to liberal construction in I
SuRv. F.A. L. 211 note 7.
28. 78 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1955).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
on the basis of personal service on H in Florida. The court affirmed a
ruling that as to the first matter the Florida court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter; as to the second matter, the court reaffirming the rule of
Sackler v. Sackler, 9 held that Florida courts will aid with all equitable
powers the enforcement of such support decrees. But on the merits, and
anticipating a second appeal, the court stated that the mandate of the
notice statute could not replace the need for pleading in the bill,30 and
that W1 was probably barred on the first point by laches.
Relying on this case as authority, the court next decided Kingston v.
Quimby."1 Here W sued in reliance on a New York separation agreement,
a Nevada divorce decree which incorporated same, and a New York judg-
ment for arrearages. H moved to have the cause transferred to the law
side of the court maintaining that the obligation to make payment was
purely contractual. From an order denying the motion, H brought
certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the writ and stated, insofar as
material to the notice statute:
Arguments are advanced here based upon the laws of Nevada
and New York but there is nothing in the pleadings or otherwise
in the record of this cause to show reliance by any party upon any
foreign law which could be controlling but which is at variance
with the laws of Florida. The absence from the record of both
pleading and proof of foreign law precludes our consideration of
contentions in briefs based upon foreign law . . . ; nor under the
circumstances does the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act require a different result.
. [a] party invoking the privileges of the Act is required
to have the record reveal that fact and to have the record show
the authorities which will be relied upon with reference to the
foreign law. This procedure . . . results in a record which contains
a clear presentation of the issues to assist the court in its decision.
This procedure must be followed by any party desiring to assure
himself of application of the benefits of the Act.32
Let this be notice to all parties who wish, in the future, to rely on
the act. Preparation should be made to plead and prove foreign law as
a fact, as before, rather than risk a chance that the record does not
sufficiently settle the issue for the court to be able to notice the foreign
law. The part of the decision which deviates the farthest from the
progressive construction formerly given in the Peterson case is the presump-
tion-a variant revival of the old common-law rule-that in the absence
29. See 1 SUMv. FLA. L. 225.
30. The precise language of the court was (78 So.2d 92, 95):
While this court and the lower court are required to take judicial
notice of the 'common law and statutes of every state . . . ' we do
not think that such evidence, in the jorn of judicial notice, will
supply the want of pleading in plaintiff's bill.
31. 80 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955).
32. Id. at 456. The court then went on to state that this interpretation accords
with Lanigan, supra, and the interpretation given in other states where adopted. The
emphasis in the quotation is by the court.
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of specific citation of authority showing a different result the foreign law
is presumed iiot to vary from the Florida law.
Jurisdiction based on presence. Continuity and fraud.-In Moore v. Lee
the court held that there was no presumption of continuity of jurisdiction
over a parent in a custody proceeding through service of process on an
attorney of record in a prior decree which had become final. 3
Two cases dealt with the matter of fraud in obtaining jurisdiction. In
Grammer v. Grammer 4 W moved to set aside a divorce obtained by
her deceased 1- on the basis that service had been fraudulent; tie court
found that she had not sustained the burden of showing faulty constructive
service. In a lower court decision, Nuzum v. Nuzum, 5 it was held that,
while insufficiency of constructive service is overcome by actual notice,
fraud in procuring a default decree permits vacation thereof.
Jurisdiction to set aside prior decree.-In the 1953 Survey the matter of
the limits on the power of the Florida courts to set aside prior decrees
was considered in some detail in the discussion of Kessler v. McGIone.38
The question was raised as to the result if H, now having set aside the
decree to which Virginia had given full faith and credit, returned to
Virginia and was met with the successful defense of res judicata in that
forum. This has now happened and once again the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari. 8 The denial of faith and credit in the second instance
seems to be a greater violation of the rule of the Treinies case 8 than the
failure of Florida to grant faith and credit to the first Virginia decree.
Certainly the interest of the original forum in preventing fraud on the
exercise of its jurisdiction, as well as the demand that the losing party
exhaust his remedies in trying to correct a result which he feels violates
the faith and credit policy, should demand greater respect to the later
judgment in a series.
33. 72 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1954).
34. 80 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1955).
35. 5 Fla. Supp. 136 (1954), for an opposite result on the question of duress
see Kennedy v. Kennedy, 5 Fla. Supp. 84 (1953). For a case reaching a somewhat
different result from that under FLA. STAT. § 72.22 (1953) on adoption and inheritance
rights, see In re Calhoun's Estate, 282 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955) making natural child of
adoptive parents sole heir of adopted child.
36. See 1 SURV. FLA. L. 216-218 and especially note 42 at 217.
37. Kessler v. Farquier Nat'l Bank, 195 Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440, cert. denied,
348 U.S. 834 (1954), 68 HARv. L. REv. 719 (1955). The Virginia court affirmed the
trial court's judgment based on defendant's demurrer to husband's suit again seeking
widower's share.
38. Cf., the statement in the HARv. L. REv. at 720, supra note 37, that "(t he
Virginia court, in adhering to its own earlier decision, was refusing to follow the widely
accepted rule that the later of two inconsistent determinations controls in a third suit."
The author is in complete agreement with an eminent authority, consulted by him on
this difficult question, namely that Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939),
is determinative of the question. Cf., 1 SUKv. Fx. L. 236, note 128 for reference to
the rule of this case in an analogous situation.
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Notwithstanding the somewhat sad demise of the Kessler case, the
court has given another"9 and perhaps more satisfactory answer to the
question of the limits of the bill of review. In Reed v. Reed40 H was
divorced from W in Nevada in 1948 and W from H in Dade County in
1949. In December 1949 the Attorney General filed a quo warranto
proceeding attacking the charter of the Miami Retreat Foundation as not
charitable within the meaning of Florida Statute, Chapter 617. Said
foundation had been started by H & W in 1926. W was joined in this
proceeding and cross-billed H and the corporate defendants, collaterally
attacking the property settlement made in the course of the Florida divorce,
in that the latter was based on fraud and concealment, The defenses of
estoppel and res judicata were interposed and on appeal the Supreme Court
held that W was estopped to contest the settlement and her cross-bill was
dismissed.41
In October 1953 W filed her original bill in the nature of an ex Parte
bill of review making a direct attack on the property settlement. Certiorari
was granted from the Chancellor's order permitting the filing of the bill,
and petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the court below
was without jurisdiction to issue the bill of review. The court stated:
An original bill in the nature of a bill of review is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court but we have held that leave
of court for filing such a bill under some circumstances was not
necessary ....
Petitioners contend that no decree affecting the rights of the
Reeds was appealed to this Court, hence they say that there was
no reason to secure the permission of the Court to file the bill.
It is true that this Court did not have the divorce suit before it at
any time but . . . the property settlement was before us and was
adjudicated .... This is the gist of the question here. We think
it was set at rest in the quo warranto proceeding and that the
respondent is estopped by judgment to again raise the question.
The chancellor therefore abused his discretion in entering the
decree appealed from.42
In speaking of "the gist of the question," rather than in terms of
technical identity of causes of action, 3 the court has placed a vital
limitation on the discretionary nature of the bill of review. If the court
is willing to follow the same philosophy in the field of enforcement of
foreign judgments, full faith and credit will also be given on a more liberal
basis.
39. The first case establishing the existence of limits, but without defining them,
was Edwards v. Edwards, 1 SURV. FLA. L. 217 note 42.
40. 70 So.d 836 (Fla. 1954).
41. Miami Retreat Foundation v. Ervin, 62 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1952). On the
main proceeding the same result as to the Att'y Gen'l was reached.
42. 70 So.2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1954). Quotation of authorities by the court is omitted
and emphasis is supplied.
43. Cf., the previous discussion I Suiv. FLA. L. 209-245.
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Several other cases deciding questions of defects in jurisdiction over
the person or subject matter must be mentioned in this connection. In
Montgomery v. Gipson" the court held that where property is held by the
entireties, the jurisdictional requirement of notice for a tax deed 4" is not
satisfied by proof of service on one spouse. Strict conformity and not
substantial complaince is required. In a similar proceeding involving
foreclosure of a tax lien, it was held in Sinclair v. Alford4" that service by
publication on "Myrtle Danby" instead of "Myrtle Danley" was insufficient
under the doctrine of idem sonans and that foreclosure based on such
service must be set aside.47
In Attaway v. Attaway" the court held that an order entered without
notice to W or counsel permitting cancellation of future alimony payments
on a past due promise to pay was void, and in Hughes v. Bunker" a similar
result was reached in a guardianship proceeding in which the mother of
the children in question was not given notice. Finally in State v. Herin0
it was held that where the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject
matter of a tort action, prohibition would not lie to review the correctness
of that court's judgment in overruling a challenge to jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.
Judicial jurisdiction. Herein of the semantics of "domicile-permanent
resident-residence."-For most of the history of Florida law domicile has
been used by the courts, and less frequently by the legislatures, in the
traditional sense, e.g., that permanent place to which our legal system looks
to fix certain judicial matters amounting to the personal law. In the
period under survey, both law-making bodies seem to have shifted from
use of the term domicile, without losing sight of the concept, to the use
of one of the residence terms noted above, It is well recognized that
when the statutes speak in terms of "residence" alone, one of three possible
meanings can attach: that the legislature meant domicile, domicile plus
actual presence, or "mere" presence. 1
As an example, the amendment to Florida Statute, Section 198.1352
requiring the filing of a copy of the federal estate tax return of "every
decedent who at the time of his death was not a resident of the United
States" changed the language in the old law from "not domiciled in." Here
44. 69 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1954).
45. FLA. STAT. § 194.18 (1954).
46. 72 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1954). See id. at 784 for previous decisions in the same
litigation.
47. For a lower court case reaching the same result in small claims matter, see
Hart v. Maas Brothers, Inc., 5 Fla. Supp. 140 (1953).
48. 80 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1955).
49. 76 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1954).
50. 80 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1955).
51. For an excellent analysis of this whole problem see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 9. comment at 42.
52. By Laws of Fla., c. 29718 (1955).
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the obvious intention is to bring the law into line with the federal concept,
and the aspect of actual presence is made obvious. 3 On the other hand,
such statutes as those dealing with non-resident motorists,5 non-resident
or resident architects, brokers, 55 life insurance agents56 or the use of residence
in multistate worker situations5 7 must be presumed to deal with typical
mobile denizen, or at least refer merely to a home without any element of
intention permanently to remain. The amount of jurisdiction which ought
to attach under these statutes should be considerably less.
At the opposite extreme are found, in line with the Restatement,
such new statutes as that which allows each and every "permanent resident"
a $1,000 personal effects and household goods tax exemption,58 or that
which ameliorates the rule on support of dependent children by allowing
state assistance where the parent or guardian has "resided" in the state
for one year before application, and the child is under one year of age.39
Of great difficulty is that of attaching the specific meaning best
intended by the legislature to those statutes dealing with the administration
of the estates of Florida "residents." This whole series60 of statutes enacted
by the 1955 legislature seem to pass the line of interstate and international
comity, if not to approach, in certain instances, that of unconstitutionality.
Since the more intimate and permanent the connection of the decedent
with the jurisdiction, the greater the chance of survival of these enactments,
it must be assumed that in using the word "resident" the legislature intended
domicile plus actual presence. Otherwise the will of such a person must
be admitted to probate in an original proceeding in Florida to be effective
at all and proceedings in any other state or country shall be ineffectual.
53. The other basis of the requirement for filing is of sufficient interest to mention
at this point:
.. . and whose gross estate shall include any real property situate and
tangible personal property having an actual situs in the State and
intangible personal property physically present within the State of
Florida. Ibid.
Giving the legislature the benefit of the doubt, we must presume that the filing require-
ment attaches as if the "ands" were of the kind that mean "or". As to the use of the
word "resident" in Section 10 of the chapter, amending FLA. STAT. § 198.33 (1953),
the same presumption of actual physical presence at time of death plus domicile should
be made.
54. Laws of Fla., c. 29963 (1955).
55. Laws of Fla., cc. 29727, 29983 (1955).
56. Laws of Fla., c. 29859 (1955).
57. Laws of Fla., c. 29768 (1955), providing that the state in which the worker
has his "residence" may be one of those solely liable for unemployment compensation,
thus amending FLA. STAT. § 443.18 (1)(a) (1953).
58. Laws of Fla., c. 29743 (1955). The statutory language removes any doubt
as to its intention and is in this sentence, at least, a model of clarity. It reads "to very
person residing and making his or her permanent home in this state. . . ." A nice
constructional problem is presented in the second sentence which provides: "Title . . .
may be held individually [which creates no problem], by the entireties, jointly or in
common with others." Suppose that the bulk of the owners in common do not satisfy
the other part of the exemption statute?
59. Laws of Fla., c. 29670 (1955) amending FLA. STAT. § 409.18 (1)(b) (1953).
60. Laws of Fla., cc. 29892, 29893 and 29894 (1955).
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This particular section"l purports to affect all personal property regardless
of situs and in this particular is, it is submitted, unconstitutional if by
"any personal property" one understands property located any place in the
world. That this was the intendment may be seen from the command to
the personal representative in the companion bill12 to "take possession of
the personal property wheresoevcr situate of a person who hereafter dies
a resident of the State ....
In Slatcoff v. Dezen6  the court had the opportunity to construe an
exemption statute63 where it was aided by double language-"citizens or
residents"-in determining that insurance policies issued before the de-
fendant became a resident were exempt within the statute, since he was
a resident at the time they were sought to be garnished and no fraud had
been proved.
In Frank v. Frank66 the court reviewed the general rules regarding
domicile, especially for divorce purposes, stating that the statute requires
an intent to become a permanent resident, this intent being an indispensable
element in proof of bona fide residence. Note must be made of the
qualifying adjectives which are always used to cloud the semantics in this
field. Then the court went on to state:
It is true we have repeatedly held that a wife may not
establish a residence (for the purpose of instituting a divorce
action) separate from that of her husband so long as she
continues to live with him . . .. The reason for such a ruling is
that the law recognizes the husband as head of the family ....
But if as in this case the former residence of the family as a unit
was in Florida and the wife for just cause separated from her
spouse, . . . she may 'tack on' to such newly established inde-
pendent residence the period of time within which she was a
resident of Florida by virtue of the establishment of the family
domicile in Florida by the husband.0T
61. Laws of Fla., c. 29892 (1955) amended FLA. STAT. § 732.26 (1) (1953).
62. Laws of Fla., c. 29893 supra, which amended FLA. STAT. § 733.01 (I)
(1953).
63. Ibid. The intent is made even clearer by the language used in the last . . .
the three statutes referred to (Laws of Fla., c. 29894) wherein the inventory must
include all personal property, if dealing with a Florida resident, and all property of all
kinds within the state, if dealing with anybody else. The statute uses the polite language
"a resident of some other state or country." Cf. the comment on the "Isle of Tobago",
supra, relative to the fourth of the statutes (which is not discussed in this text because
in the opinion of the author it is on the other side of the line of constitutionality).
Under Laws of Fla., c. 29961 (1955) amending FLA. S'rAT. § 732.47 (1953) by inserting
a new sub-paragraph (4), it is made a vioaltion of the law of Florida for a person
named in a will of a florida decedent who is not qualified to act under domiciliary
letters (Florida) to apply for letters in any other state or country, for the purpose of
administering property of a Florida resident "located elsewhere than in the State of
Florida."
64. 76 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1954).
'65. FLA. STAT. § 222.14 (1953). See identical language in Rule III, Rules of
Practice, Fla. R.R. & P.U.C., 4 Fla. Supp. 239 (1953); for a new statute using the same
double language but with the "and" connective, see Laws of Fla., c. 29764 (195 5),
The Florida School Code, section 97 amending FLa. STAT. § 239.02 (1953).
66. 75 So.Zd 282 (Fla. 1954).
67. Id at 286.
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In Quentin Y. Quentin the Circuit court relied on the decision in
the Campbell case to determine that the jurisdictional requirements of
the divorce statute require actual residence in the state and that this
"amounts to something more than a requirement of bare domicile." The
present court analogized the service of plaintiff to the company for which
he worked, to the military service of the plaintiff in the Campbell case.69
The fact that, on the occasion of a former visit, he might have declared
an intention to reside in Florida when a transfer in his employment would
be obtained was all that was within his power, and insufficient to found
the jurisdiction of the court.
Florida now has reached the same conclusion as other jurisdictions
on the effect of a Mexican mail-order divorce. In Klose v. Klose 0 H had
failed, for lack of evidence, to obtain a Florida divorce.7 ' Thereafter, H
and Wl entered into a property settlement agreement, obtained a foreign
divorce and H remarried. In modifying the agreement and allowing
maintenance, the court said:
The Mexican court had no jurisdiction whatsoever over this
defendant [H]. At all times he was a resident of Florida and
actually was domiciled here. At all times she . . . was a resident
of Florida and domiciled here. At no time was any notice,
personal or constructive, served on the plaintiff here of the pending
exican divorce litigation. . . . This court therefore holds that
the Mexican divorce was of no force or effect and that the plaintiff
is still the wife of the defendant.72
In the matter of jurisdiction to tax intangibles, Sawtelle v. Tax
Assessor73 held that where one co-trustec resided in Florida, and all other
68, 4 Fla. Supp. 28 (1953).
69. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952), 1 Suuv. FLA. L. 210, note 2,
For a result contrary to the rule of this case, see Wilson v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 411, 272
P.2d 319 (1954) holding constitutional a New Mexico statute allowing jurisdiction for
divorce on the basis of continuous presence for one year in military service. Regarding
constitutional standards requiring domicile as the basis for divorce jurisdiction referred
to in our discussion of Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954), in 1 Sutv. FLA. L. 225,
note 82, note that that case was dismissed as moot by the Supreme Court. Therefore
the rule of the Third Circuit remains in effect, reinforced now by the holding in Gran.
ville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 348 U.S. 810 (1954); however, the Court avoided the
troublesome question and entered into the even more dangerous problem of the powers
of Congress over the Territory, in deciding that the Legislature of the Virgin Islands was
without authority to adopt a non-domiciliary requirement. Contra., David-Ziesniss v.
David-Ziesness 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (the state where the marriage was
entered into has power to dissolve it.) The continued restatement still supports the
classic rule, see RESTATEMENT, Conflicts, §§ 110,111,113, comment (a) at 34 (1953).
70. 6 Fla. Supp, 28 (1953); on the problem of Mexican divorces, see Comment,
9 MIAMI L.Q. 186 (1955).
71. See Klose v. Klose, 59 So.2d 877 (la. 1951).
72. 6 Fla. Supp. 28 (1953). This leaves open the interestin questions: 1 is
the wife a wife for all purposes and 2) is the husband now guilty of bigamons cohab-
tation? Another interesting case on jurisdiction for divorce is one which established
the requirement that both parties to a divorce must be alive at the time of the
recording of the decree, per Milledae, J. in Jacobs v. Jacobs, 6 Fla. Supp. 88 (193-)
See also, on evidence of domicile, the practical and valuable comments of Giblin, J. in
DuPont v. DuPont, 5 Fla. Supp. 121 (1954).
73. 5 Fla. Supp. 13 (1953).
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contacts were in other jurisdictions, assessment under chapter 199 of the
Florida Statutes would be cancelled. Greenough v. Tax Assessors74 was
held to operate only where a statute expressly provided for such taxation,
and under the rule of Florida Nat'l Bank v. Simpson " the statute had
been held not to cover this situation. The court resolved the "nicely
balanced doubts" in favor of the taxpayer.
In concluding this section, mention should be made of several
miscellaneous problems dealt with by the court. These were matters such
as venue, double jurisdiction within the state, and equitable enforcement
of out-of-state decrees by injunction. In Florida Nursery v. PickardO it was
held that venue was at the plaintiff's place of business in an action on an
open account, Two cases dealt with the coordinate jurisdiction of the
Juvenile and Circuit courts. In the first, State v. Hazlett,77 the court held
that even illegitimacy (and certainly not mere absence of conventional
marriage) would not deprive the father of his right to the custody of his
children, they having been abandoned by the mother. The Juvenile Court
then, on notice to the father, entered an order holding the children in a
home for their placement or adoption. Thereafter, the father brought
an uncontested divorce action in the circuit court and obtained their
custody by order of that court. Later, in State v. Hunt, the Supreme Court
held78 that normally the tribunal first acting obtains exclusive jurisdiction,
but that the Juvenile and Circuit Courts are coordinate in this respect,
and the former might proceed with its jurisdiction where the mother, a
party to the divorce action in the circuit court, failed to move for a stay.
An analogous situation was presented in Harrison v. Harrison79 where
W sought a divorce a mensa et thoro in Pennsylvania and H later sued W
for absolute divorce there. Alimony, suit money and attorney's fees were
allowed in Pennsylvania. H then brought suit for divorce in Florida and
W moved for a stay; her motion was denied. The court below denied
alimony and other relief. The Supreme Court felt that the ruling on
alimony was correct but that W was entitled to full relief on the matter
of suit money and attorney's fees.
The decision, in the posture of the litigation, seems eminently sound
since ". . . the petitioner found herself a litigant in the chancery court
in Florida over her protest."80  The suggestion might be made that the
original decision, affirming the denial of a stay, was incorrect in that the
court might have applied the reasoning of Gessler v. Gesslero1 or the policy
behind the stay relief provided in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
74. 331 US. 486 (1947],
75. 59 So.2d 751 (fla. 1951).
76. 4 Fla. Supp. 143 (1953).
77. 4 Fla. Supp. 50 (1950).
78. 70 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1954).
79. 71 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1954).
80. Id. at 731.
81. Gessler v. Gessler, 78 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1955).
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Act. In view of the equitable enforcement of foreign support decrees, the
time may be ripe for relief in the form of injunction against further pro-
ceedings, where such an injunction is entered by a foreign court having
personal jurisdiction over the parties. 8 2  The Florida doctrine of comity
is sufficiently developed to provide for that type of cooperation, and logic
compels the result, since the Florida courts would give full faith and credit
to a judgment rendered in such a litigation."
Res Judicata.-The decision in Wagner v. Baron8' has been subjected to
two limitations by the court, both rendered by a division consisting of the
dissenters in that case. The first of these limitations deals with the con-
struction of the exception to the doctrine of res judicata therein created.
The court held that a former adjudication was no defense ". . . where
the law. . . is different, .. . or there has been an intervening decision .. ",,5
In the case of Plymouth Citrus Products v. Williamson"0 the full Work-
men's Compensation Commission 87 had allowed what was, in effect, a
second action relying on such an intervening decision as having changed
the law.88  In reversing, the court, Mathews (late C.J.),Roberts (then
C.J.),Terrell and Sebring stated:
There must be an end to litigation sometime. As to the facts
in this particular case, the doctrine of res adjudicata applies. (Cit-
ing cases, but no Florida authorities) The case of Wagner v. Baron,
Fla., 64 So. 2d 267, was strongly relied upon ... but is not applicable
.... There was no question involved in that case of an intervening
decision (emphasis of the court) which changed the rule of law
or the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of the father of the
bastard child. The change in that case was effected by a statute.
(emphasis of the court) After a judgment, order or decree has
become final and the time for appeal has expired, an intervening
decision which may change the liability or rule of law applicable
to the ease is not sufficient ground to open the case up for the
filing of a new claim under the same facts.89
82. See, on this question, Briggs, infra note 228 at 343-44 and note 57 supporting
this statement.
83. On such cooperative injunctive relief in aid of in personam marital litigation
see Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A.2d 738 (1940), and see Edell v. Edell, 134
N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup.Ct. 1955) a case involving New York and Florida. The policy
on equitable relief is well stated in Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950), note
29. The party that proceeds in violation of such an injunction works a fraud ou the
local court as well as risking the lack of faith and credit in the issuing state as to any
decree rendered in favor of an injunction violator. For further consideration of the
consecutive jurisdiction problem, see the discussion of the Cessler case, supra note 81.
84. 64 So.2d 267 (1953); 1 Suav. FLA. L. 230.
85. Id. at 267; 1 SURv. FLA. L. 230 note 104.
86. 71 So.2d 162 (1954).
87. Opinion of the Commission in 4 Fla. Supp. 82 (1954), earlier opinion in 3
Fla, Supp. 105 (1953).
88. Id. at 84. The case relied on was Gray v. Employers, 64 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1951).
The precise language of the Commission was:
The contention has been advanced that the previous proceedings . . . are
res judicata to the present claim. We are of the opinion that the defense
of res judicata is not available to the parties . . . where there has been an
intervening decision such as the Gray case, sopra, changing the law governing
the first determination. Wagner v. Baron
89. 71 So.2d 162, 163 (1954).
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It would appear, therefore, that the court has disposed of part of
the dictum in the Wagner case. The amplitude of the language at the
beginning of the final paragraph quoted above would seem to indicate
an intention to apply the holding to all forms of action, but the later
mention of "claim" in that same sentence might be utilized by the court
at some future time to limit the doctrine to Workmen's Compensation
proceedings. The fairer interpretation is that the court intended to restore
the sound doctrine of judicial repose by removing the larger part of the
Wagner exception and restricting changes in the law to those created by
statutory enactment.00
The dissentients in the Wagner case achieved a second limitation on
the doctrine of that case-this in the field of limitation of actions. The
opinion was written by Roberts and concurred in by Mathews, Terrell and
Sebring. 1  The statute, 2 admittedly retroactive as to the amount of
liability for support and geographically unlimited as to the place of creation
of the bastard child for whom support was sought, was held to be limited
by the general statute of limitations. Neither the New Act 3 nor the
Old Act 9' contained a specific limitation:
We have no difficulty in holding, however, that a bastardy
proceeding under the Old Act was subject to the three-year
limitation period prescribed by Subsection 5(a) of Section 95.11
[Fla. Stat.] . . . . What we have said as to bastardy proceedings
under the Old Act is equally applicable to proceedings under
the New Act .... 95
At the same time, it is unfortunate that the Court once again avoided
consideration of the difficult question of the possible applicability of foreign
law in determination of the status being litigated in Florida. Even on the
point of the period of limitations, which is frequently deemed to be con-
trolled by the lex fori, the court merely mentioned in passing, but without
comment that ". . appellant's answer . . . also alleged that the . . cause
90. It is to be hoped that, even within the narrower exception as now construed,
the court will limit the exception to statutory changes which embody some fundamental
public policy, as in the Wagner case, and not permit it with regard to any change in
mere private rights that the legislature might make. On the authority of the principal
case, another order of the Commission was quashed in Iowa National Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Harland, 72 So.2d 47 (1954).
91. Wall v. Johnson, 78 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1955).
92. Fx. STAT. 4 742.011 (1953).
93. Id.
94. See I SURv. FLA. L. 230 and notes 104, 105 and 106.
95. 78 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1955). The use of the legal limitation in a court
of equity applies under the doctrine of HK.L. Realty v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954).
For a discussion of this case, see supra note 13. The present court admitted that
in Rooney v. Teske, 61 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1952), 1 Somy. A. L. 229 and Wagner v.
Baron, 64 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1953), no decision had been made as to "what were
the limits, if any, of such retroactivity." Here, in rationale at least, the court has
boldly (and correctly, it is submitted) adhered to and given support to the essence
of Mr. Justice Thomas' dissent in the case. See 1 Sutv. FLA. L. at 230, and note 105.
Particularly noteworthy is this language: "The nature of such a charge, and the
difficulties inherent in a defense thereto, are such that a prompt determination of thequestion of paternity is highly desirable." 78 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1955).
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of action was barred by lapse of time both in the State of New York and
in this state."96
The decision recognizes the "double-barreled" nature of the New
Act which both grants new remedies for formerly existing causes of action
and creates new causes of action.9 In its concluding language, the court
loses sight of this distinction and speaks of the retrospectivity of Rooney
v. Teske as not being so extensive that "its retroactive effect should be
extended to revive causes of action which were barred under the Old Act-
and, by analogy, to confer retrospectively a right of action for bastardy,
regardless of the time when the operative facts which give rise to such
a right of action occurred." Quite correctly, the court points out that the
limitation problem was not at issue in the previous decisions but the state-
ment quoted fails to apply the distinction alluded to above. Before the
New Act there was no cause of action for non-residents, hence it could
not be barred three years before the Act which created it. The quoted
language confuses the clarification made; a clear decision that there should
not be retroactivity in newly created rights would have been more honest
than a false analogy.98
96. 78 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1955).
97. .-. . it goes without saying that no greater period of retroactivity should
be allowed to causes of action created by the New Act that to those
which existed prior to its enactment-particularly in view of the fact
that it might be argued that, as to the latter class (the existing rights),
the New Act was not subject to the presumption against retrospective
operation since it did not create a new cause of action but merely
provided an enlarged remedy for an existing cause of action." 78 So.2d 371, 372.
98. It cannot be argued that the application of the general statute of limitations
to the newly-expanded but formerly existing causes of action is a sound countervailing
of public policy in the state's interest, in seeing that bastards and unwed mothers are
maintained. Perhaps the same public policy should be applied to the new act's new
causes of action. This decision does not do it, since the quoted language shows that the
actions had not accrued; however the Court seems worried lest the previous decisions
be construed to give unlimited retroactivity to both classes of rights. In haste, to
avoid this possibility, the court created a new point of possible confusion when it
stated that:
"these decisions are not, then, authority for the . . contention that the
New Act should be given an unlimited retroactice effect." Id.
What does the court mean by use of the word "then"? If the court now intends
"then" to equal "now," after this decision, it can be argued that the only limitation
imposed is the temporal one because that is all that the instant case deals with. On
the other hand, if "then" means "at the time of the decision of the respective cases,"
the court implies the existence of not only this, but other limitations which will be
divided in the future, as necessary or convenient, destroying immediately the reliability
of both prior decisions.
For further proceedings in Wall v. Johnson, see 80 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1955)
wherein a putative father petitioned for restitution of counsel fees and additional
support paid before reversal; the court held that in the absence of fraud or bad
faith trial court's discretion in refusing to order same was supported by the respective
equities of the parties and would not be disturbed. For a non-conflict determination
of the meaning of res judicata see Thornal, J. concurring specially in Dade County v.
Rauzin, 81 So.2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1955).
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
Effect of prior proceedings: Herein of full faith and credit and comity. 9 -
The Florida court continued, during the period under review, both its
struggle with the unmanageable dichotomy of res judicata and estoppel by
judgment, and its attempt to follow the proper mandate of the Supreme
Court with regard to the faith and credit to be given the other jurisdictions.
Since the state remains'00 one of the major forums for the settlement of
domestic problems and creates a vast amount of family law, the court
would be well advised to respect out of state proceedings with a generosity
similar to that granted Florida proceedings abroad.101
Continuing its attack on the real substance of the full faith and credit
clause, the court decided Roy v. Roy102 without mention of either the
Gordon or Riehl cases.' 03 W sued H for separate maintenance in the
District of Columbia and had been awarded title to certain real property.
The grounds were desertion and cruelty. Subsequently H sued W for
divorce alleging cruelty, desertion and habitual intemperance. The granting
of the decree was affirmed. The Court simply said: "The causes of action
were entirely different.' 10 4  The prior proceeding was denied effect both
as res judicata or estoppel by judgment.
In Dwyer v. Dwyer,'"" the court found that an interlocutory California
divorce decree was not such a decree as would satisfy the ground for a
Florida divorce "that the defendant has obtained a divorce . . . in any
other state or country.'1 0 The answer admitted the California decree and
H moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was res judicata.
The court reversed the decree granting W the divorce on the basis that
99. In this section, we will discuss not only the matters covered in the same
section in 1 SURy. FLA. L. at 224, but also those dealt with in the section on res
iudicata and collateral estoppel, id. at 226, as well as certain new questions raised in
the general area of faith and credit.
100. All this in spite of several attempts during the 1955 legislative session to
len gthen the period of residence for divorce purposes to one year; in spite, also, of
Judge Giblin's continued efforts to raise the standards in this field, which have
produoed such novel and salutory results as the naming of a special master to investigate
charges of adultery made by letter in Bartulis v. Bartulis, Ch. No. 170991, 11th Judicial
Circuit, creating thereby a sufficient interest in the state that the action be no longer
subject to voluntary dismissal.
101. 3y "abroad' is meant both intra-and international. See Stem v. Stem,
132 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1954) and Dunne v, Saban, 3 All ER. 586 (1954)
commented on in 71 L.Q. REv. 191 (1955); 33 CAN. BAR. REv. 475 (1955); 4
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 220 (1955); but cf. further comment on the principal case id.
at 392-93 by Kennedy, especially this statement at 393: "Dunne v. Saban is so obviously
ill.considered that no more need be said of it for the moment. Let us hope that
it is taken to a higher court."
102. 73 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1954).
103. Gordon v. Cordon 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952) and Riehl v. Riehl, 60 So.2d 35
(Fla. 1952). Comment on the former in 1 SURv. FLA. L. at 226-28 and the latter at 228.
104. 73 So,2d 294 (Fla. 1954).
105. 72 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1954). The same division that decided the instant
case was later to decide Roy v. Roy, supra note 102. It consisted of Terrell, Roberts,
Sebring and Mathews, 7j.
106. Id. at 379. The language is from FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (8) (1953).
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the statutory ground demands such finality as would satisfy the full faith
and credit clause. This reversal seems correct on the basis of both the
general California law and the nature of the decree in question.
It is curious that in neither of these cases did the court choose to
enlarge on the previous adjudication aspect of the litigation. Certainly
some effect ought to be given even if it falls short of the automatic one
given matters within the mandate.OT The Dwyer case also contains this
interesting language:
In the first place, to satisfy the requirement of F.S. § 65.04(8),
F.S.A., entitling the decree of divorce to full faith and credit . . .
the decree must be absolute .. 0s
And further:
It is held in this jurisdiction that the decree of a foreign state
that is subject to modification may not be accorded full faith and
credit under Section 1, Article IV, Federal Constitution.109
It does not seem consistent to confuse the finality required to satisfy
a local statutory ground for divorce with that which is required so that
the court must give heed to a foreign adjudication, nor does it seem
appropriate that the local law should be used to define a constitutional
norm which operates independently of it. The second statement is not true
universally and if it were to be made, it should be qualified, especially since
the case law of Florida gives effect to support and alimony decrees which
are subject to modification.
A Florida decree was given the broadest possible support by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Minnear v. MinnearA' H had been required
to pay alimony by the decree and sought to set aside the property settlement
contained therein. He relied on the power of the court to make new orders
where "reciprocal support of dependents statutes" are involved. The
Colorado court held the act unconstitutional as violative of the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution, stating that ". . . our courts are
open for the recognition and enforcement of valid foreign judgments, and
not to declare a judgment of another state.., totally void ....
In Wolk v. Leak" 2 the court reached the same conclusion as the
Colorado court with regard to an Ohio decree for alimony and support
money not subject to modification. "The rule is settled in this jurisdiction
that foreign divorce decrees providing for alimony and support money are
107. See prtvious discussion in 1 SURv. FrA. L. at 224 and note 75.
108. 72 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1954).
109. Id. at 380. The court cited Boyer v. Andrews, 143 Fla. 462, 196 So. 825
(1940), and Cohen v. Cohen, 158 F1a. 802, 30 So.2d 307 (1947) as authority for
thisp ropiti
110.i o-Colo. ,281 P.2d 517 (1955).111. Id. at .281 P.2d at 519.
112. 70 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1954). The decision was by the same division as in the
Dwyer and Roy cases.
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entitled to full faith and credit in Florida . . . ."1 To this must be
added the presumption which runs against the judgment debtor that past
due installments are not subject to modification. The court felt that to
deprive such a decree of faith and credit enforcement the law of the state
of rendition must clearly provide for modification of past due installments,
and that failing such a provision, the mere pendency of a petition for
future modification could have no effect on the result in the instant case.
A full scale and careful analysis of the Ohio authorities 1 4 was made by
the court in reaching this conclusion.
Significant comments in this area of Florida law were made in two
New York cases.115 Both held that recovery for support money could be
had for past due installments without first obtaining a Florida court order
and both construed the power to modify under the change of circumstances
and ability to pay rule as being solely prospective 116
Reichert v. Appel 1"7 gave the court an opportunity to establish one
of the accepted limitations on the full faith and credit clause and also
provided a case of "divisible divorce." H, defendant in the original action
in Illinois, now sought to impeach the appearance filed therein and was
113. Id. at 500. Citing also Boyer v. Andrews and the Cohen case, supra note 109,
for this proposit ion.114. Id. at 501.
115. Moore v. Mackay, 132 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1954) and Stem v. Stem,
132 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1954) supra note 101. The court in the former case found
that the "thereafter" in FLA. STAT. 65.15 (1953) was crucial, and the second case
relied on this determination. The language in Wolk v. Leak, supra note 112, bears
out the correctness of this determination. With regard to a more general question, the
New York court made this statement:
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Griffin v. Griffin, 1946, 327 U.S.
220 . . . , adopted the view that under New York law, accrued alimony was
not a vested right although no modification of the decree had been made
prior to its accrual. The Court of Appeals, however, in the case of Waddey
v. Waddey, 1943, 290 N.Y. 251 . - . indicated that it entertained the opposite
view, and since this involves a question on state law, the view of the Court
of Appeals would be controlling in this instance. Erie v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 ... Moore v. Mackey, 132 N.Y.S. 2d. 813, 815 (Sup, Ct.
1954).
116. For a recent construction of the same section by the Florida court see
Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1954). Except for modification possible
within this section, the decree was given the effect of res judicata. In an earlier
case, the court had already held that where, without fraud or duress, the wife
had relinquished her right to alimony in consideration of a property settlement and
money payment, the agreement was fully performed and alimony would not be
awarded under FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1953) (change of circumstance rule) Haynes
v. Haynes, 71 So.2d (Fla. 1954). On prior review (interlocutory certiorari) the court
had merely determined that the question of fulfillment of the stipulation was within
the scope of the section. Idem, 40 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1949). The court cited
Norton v. Norton, 131 Fla. 219, 179 So. 414 (1938), for an explanation of the
difference between a property settlement and alimony in installments. The intent
of the parties governs as per the agreement incorporated in the decree. Only where
there is doubt as to the total relinquishment of rights, and when the agreement is
executory should it be modified, Cohn v. Mann, 38 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1949). The
court also determined the collateral point in the principal case that, if the wife moves
to modify, suit money is not recoverable under FLA. STAT. § 65.16 (1953); only if
she is forced to defend an attempted modification by the husband, Simpson v. Simpson,
63 So.2d 764, 765 (Fla. 1952), is such recovery allowed.
117. 74 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1954).
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held by Illinois law to be estopped to challenge the decree since he had
married a second time in reliance thereon. 8 The court found, however,
that an issue of material fact was tendered by his present answer that no
notice had been served on him at the time the decree for support money
was entered against him. Summary judgment on the Illinois judgment for
arrearages should not have been granted W on the basis of the provision
in Illinois law 1 9 that procedural due process requires such notice before
the money judgment can be entitled to full faith and credit. This is true
notwithstanding the fact that valid personal jurisdiction for divorce had
been obtained on H.
On the matter of "divisible divorce"120 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has reopened all of the troublesome problems implicit
in this concept in a case involving a Florida decree. Hopson v. Hopson' 2'
was decided by the Court sitting en bane, the majority reaching the con-
clusion that an ex parte Florida divorce did not terminate W's right to
support and maintenance. The dissenting judges, Stephens and Wilbur K.
Miller, raised questions both as to the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction
over parties not domiciled in the District, and as to the survivability of a
non-adjudicated claim for maintenance.1 22
Of particular importance to the Florida practitioner is this statement
of the majority, after modifying the rule of the Meredith case 125 as to general
equity powers of the courts of the district:
. . [in allowing maintenance actions] there may be no necessity
for a frontal attack upon the validity of the foreign ex Parte
divorce . . . There are two important reasons why courts should
seek to avoid such an attack. First, because of the deference due
to the proceedings of a sister state; and second, the result of the
attack might well be to stigmatize. unnecessarily a subsequent
marriage and the children born thereof. Since the question of
118. Citing as authority RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 112 (1934), as
well as the always reliable 19 C.J. Divorce, § 850, 27 C.J.S. Divorce, § 337 and 17
AM. JR. Divorce and Separation, § 401. Cf. Doherty v. Traxler, 66 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1951).
119. 74 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1954). It is not made clear just what the form
of notice should be in order to satisfy procedural due process once the in personamjurisdiction is attached-which is presumed to continue where it is specifically retained
as in the case. The standards of "the general rule" are to be found in Griffin v. Griffin,
supra note 115, but cf. comment on that case in Moore v. Mackay, supra note 115
and in Benjamin v. Benjamin, 78 Fla. 14, 82 So. 597 (1919) and Peacock v. Peacock,
160 Fla. 630, 36 So.2d 206 (1948).
120. For a general discussion on this problem see Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So.2d 870LFla. 1948) in 1 SuRv. FLA. L. 224 and in note 77. For a comment on this case see.
Graveson, Judicial Interpretation of Divorce Jurisdiction in The Conflict of Laws, 17
Mon. L. R~v. 501 (1954).
121. 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
122. A detailed discussion of the lengthy opinions is not included, as they deal
principally with the local law of the District. The case is included in this Survey in
view of the continuing importance of the jurisdiction for divorce, the basis thereof,
and the consequences of such adjudications as the Alton case, see 1 Suxv. FLA. L. 225
and especially note 82, and the recent decision in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith,
supra note 69.
123. Meredith v. Meredith, 204 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir. 1953).
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maintenance does not depend in each case upon the invalidity of
the foreign divorce, sound judicial practice ordinarily will avoid a
frontal attack upon such decree. 124
The entire court focuses its attention on the scope of Estin v. Estin125
and May v. Anderson 20 taken together in this perplexed field of migratory
divorce, and the maintenance of the by-products thereof. In view of the
prestige of the court whose opinion is now under discussion, and the
continuing interest of the Supreme Court, as well as the badly confused
state of the law of faith and credit in this entire field, a new consideration
of these problems by the high court may result herefrom. No easy solution
has yet been found nor has a satisfactory one been announced. Perhaps
the former does not exist but hope should not be lost that the latter will
some day be discovered.
Jurisdiction in matters of child custody:1' Herein of the change of
circumstances exception'2S-Normally matters involving custody of minor
children and support money for them are litigated together and the
exception with regard to change of circumstances has been applied in both
categories. As has been shown, the obligation of support must be based
on in personam jurisdiction and sufficient notice to satisfy procedural due
process. Hence, the statute permitting modification 2 9 is impliedly subject
to that control. In the analogous field of custody, the Florida court had
evolved the doctrine that once jurisdiction has attached, through presence
of the children, or in certain exceptional cases, presence of the parents, 30
no faith and credit need be given custody proceedings in another juris-
124. 221 F.2d 839, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1955) Stephens, C.J. dissenting in this
respect, makes this comment on the majority holding:
In the instant case this court, taking the Meredith decision, ... as a point
of departure, rules in respect of that decision thus: The court accepts and
affirms its ruling in the Meredith case that a grant of maintenance after a
valid foreign ex parte divorce decree is a question of local policy and not a
full faith and credit problem. Id. at 850.
125. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
126. 345 U.S. 528 (1953) commented on in another aspect infra note 137. For a
neighbor's comment on this problem see the excellent consideration of the Common-
wealth authorities in O'Connell, Recognition and Effects of Forign Adoption Orders,
33 CAN. BAR. Rnv. 635 (1955).
127. For the basic authorities see I SURV. FLA. L. 228 and note 95. That the
change of circumstances exception still governs, see a recent case, York v. York,
78 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1955) and id. at 408. The authorities cited in note 95 are
characterized at 408 as having been "controversial" cases to distinguish them from
the curious York cases.
For the title of this subsection the author is indebted to Prof. Max Rheinstein
whose admirable article in 26 CONN. BAR. JOUR. 48 (1952) is highly recommended.
See reference thereto in Briggs, op. cit. infra note 149 at 351; see also note 87.
128. See in general the discussion in 1 SarV. FLA. L. 222, 223, 228, especially
note 69; see also Moore v. Mackay, 132 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
129. FLA. STAT. § 6515 (1953) and especially questions raised in 1 SrRv. FLA. L.
223 at note 72, and discussion supra note 115.
130. State ex rel. Rasco v. Rasco, 139 Fla. 349, 190 So. 510 (1939) and authorities
collected therein.
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diction 1 So important has the presence of the minors become that the
legislature enacted a law in the past session making it a felony for a party
to an action to knowingly remove a child from the jurisdiction. 32
The first intimation that the court was to stiffen its interpretation
of the change of circumstances rule, giving greater faith and credit to a
foreign decree, came in Jones Y. Oakes.133  W was the plaintiff in the
original divorce proceedings in Missouri and was given custody of the four
minor children of the marriage. H had visitation rights and possesson in
alternate summer and Christmas vacations. Each parent was to bear the
expenses during the time of possession of the children. Both parents had
remarried by the time of this action, in which W sought full time custody
of the youngest child and greater support for the two younger children
while out of her possession. Both prayers were granted as well as a decree
that H support an institutionalized child. W's petition for reimbursement
was denied.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the entire award insofar as it
favored W and affirmed the lower court's denial of reimbursement. It
stated:
The decree of the Missouri Court is conclusive as to all matters
properly before the court there that were finally determined
in that decree. The only jurisdiction reserved ...was to 'alter,
amend, or modify ...to meet the needs and best welfare of said
children."8 4
The court found that in no way was the welfare of the institutionalized
child involved, and that under the facts and the Missouri decree the mother
had bome only the proper amount of the expense. As to the matter of
custody of the youngest child (Whipple Jr. or Boochie), the court con-
eluded "that no facts have been established that would justify any change
in the Missouri decree. .. .
This is the first indication that the power of the court, having the
parties present, would be restricted to the authority reserved by the court
in the prior proceeding. While the court does not adumbrate the coin-
cidence, it may be meaningful that the reserved power was aimed at the
same interest as that which the Florida court would normally protect.180
131. In a case involving both aspects of this question, the Colorado court held
that a Texas child support decree was not res judicata in Colorado. Potter v. Potter,
278 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1955), 27 Rocnr MT. L. REv. 350.
132. Laws of Fla., c. 29654 (1955).
133. 71 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1954).
134. Id. at 254-55.
135. Id. at 256. For a non-conflict case explanatory of such a change in circum-
stances, see Child v. Child 4 Fla. Supp. 128 (1953).
136. Cf. Bennett v. Kennett, 73 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1954), a non-conflict, all-Florida
case in which the court referred to Jones v. Oakes with approval and as controlling,
id. at 278, and quoted the language quoted in the text supra. That the interest is the
same may be seen from this statement, also at 278:
The primary concern of this Court is and should be the welfare of the
children. If any change is to be made . . . we are warranted ... only on
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Before the decision in May v. Anderson,17 the mother in Gessler v.
Gessler 3 8 would have found herself in a most difficult position. H and W
were married in Pennsylvania and had been domiciled there until shortly
before this action. Shortly after separation H brought the two minor children
of the marriage to Florida and informed NV, whom lie supported, that he
intended to establish a domicile. H had been in Florida only a few days
when XV appeared and recaptured the children, removing them to Pennsyl-
vania. About ten days thereafter H instituted this suit with construction
service on W. Her special appearance being overruled, W, took certiorari to
the Supreme Court under Rule 34.
In granting the writ with directions to dismiss the bill, the court stated:
We see no escape from the conclusion that this is a proceeding in
personam against a non-resident defendant, that the courts of
Pennsylvania have jurisdiction of the wife and the minor children
139
In reaching this conclusion the court flately rejected H's contention
that his intention to establish a domicile was sufficient to found "jurisdiction
over the mother for custodial purposes . . .secured by publication. 7"140 In
line with the decision in May v. Anderson, the court in the Gessler case
affirmed the doctrine of presence of the children before guardianship may
be litigated, or at least the personal presence of both parties. And they noted
that in the case:
Justice Jackson pointed out that for the reason that [sic!] we are
historically a mobile people the rigid concept of domicile rooted
in the common law because of feudal attachment to land is too
stern for a society so restless as ours. Our law, however, recognizes
separate legal entities, consequently the means so provided is the
method of recognizing them.' 4'
the basis of a change , . . occurred since the date of [the] decree or on the
basis of facts bearing upon the question which were in existence at the time
he decree was made but were unknown to the Court . . . . Sayward v.
Sayward, Fla. 1950, 43 So.2d 865. And, even if we do determine that there
has been a substantial change in conditions, we would be warranted in altering
said decree only where it appears that the welfare of the children will be pro-
moted thereby.
137. 345 U. S. 528 (1953).
138. Gessler v. Gessler, 78 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1955).
139. Id. at 724. Under the new statute, see note 132 supra, but for a few days
difference, a wife removing her children might become liable for a crime, were her
special appearance to be overruled. The existence of this penalty will probably act
to strengthen the rule in the Gessler case and may even result in reciprocal legislation
making the original removal by the husband from the basic domicile punishable. That
the removal of children in custody from the jurisdiction does not terminate the duty
to support, and is authorized unless expressly forbidden by decree, see Gorgol v. Gorgol,S FHa. Supp. 174 (1952).140. Id. at 723. The court went on to say that neither the children were
present nor did the mother come here personally to move for dismissal and that when
guardianship is the question, habeas corpus is the remedy.
141. Id. at 724. And the decision remains valid notwithstanding the liberalization
of the legislature in providing in FLA. STAT. § 744.13(1) (1953) that both parents
are joint guardians of their minor children and that either may establish a domicile
for the purpose of determining custody. But cf. the latest in Cone v. Cone, 4 Fla.
Supp. 123 (1953), 1 SuRv. FA. L. 238, note 134.
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These two decisions taken together mean that the court has taken a
position of much stricter faith and credit than was apparent before. If the
interests of the present litigants will be measured by the scope of the initial
decree in an area not formerly protected even by the doctrine of res judicata,
and the rights of absent parents protected by the refusal of jurisdiction, the
trend may be expected to carry over to the alimony and support field in
which the legislature has taken an even greater interest. 412
Full Faith and Credit: Powers of Foreign Appointed Guardian over Local
Res.-In the previous Survey, note was made of the fact that this field is
imposed.143 Note was also taken of the surprising final decision in Beverly
Beach Properties v. Nelson'44 and further comment was withheld pending
action that might be taken by a higher court. 14 5 To reach the result that it did
in the principal case, the court not only had to characterize the subject matter
of the litigation in a new way-changing it from a question of the power
to sell local land to the power to vote shares of stock in local corporations-
it had also to extend faith and credit to a new field. Since greater than
imposed respect for acts in another state would not disturb the Supreme
Court, it is easy to see why certiorari was not granted.146
It is not possible to criticize apparent inconsistencies in the facts found
in each of the various stages of this litigation. The court now finds that
Zetterlund had the capacity to acquire a new domicile in California and
surrender his former domicile in Florida. It might be supposed that even
if he had lost the capacity to change his domicile, the court would construe
the California law as giving the competent court the power to appoint a
guardian for him, on the basis of his presence without domicile.
Then follow the interesting statements
The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution requires
thzt the courts of this State recognize the action of the California
142. For a recent federal case in this area, see In re Adoption of Minor, 214 F.2d
844 (5th Cir. 1954).
143. 1 SURV. FLA. L. 222 note 69. But cf. discussion in preceding section.
144. 68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1953). For prior history of this litigation see 1 Sory.
FLA. L. 211 at note 10; Note 9 MiAMI L.Q. 85 (1955).
145. Ibid., cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1955); for newspaper comment see Miami
Daily News, May 22, 1955, P. 16A, col. 1, under headline "Way is Cleared for Big
Project in S. Broward." Excerpts are instructive on the handling by the press of
legal matters:
In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the case of
the Estate of Olof Zetterlund vs. Samuel Friedland . . . . For the next six
years the case shuttled between the circuit courts and the Florida Supreme
Court. In August, 1955, the Florida Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision(which) ruled out the fraud angle and termed the transaction a fair one.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in effect, upheld the state's jurists for it contended
that no constitutional question was involved.
146. A general comment might be made with reference to the Supreme Court's
attitude toward review of Florida decisions. Outside of the civil rights area little
interest has even been shown, as witness not only the denial here, but also in the
final stage of the Kessler v. McClone, 55 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1951), litigation; see
comment 1 Suav. FiA. L. 217 at note 42.
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court in the appointment of the guardian, in the construction of
the legality of that appointment and the actions of the guardian
as such, so long as the guardian was acting under the laws of the
State of California. . . It is conceded . . . that the California
guardian could not have sold real property situate in Florida
without ancillary proceedings . . .but we think a different rule
applies with reference to the voting of shares of stock (intangible
personal property to which the rule mobilia sequuntur pcrsonam
is applicable) in corporations chartered by this14 State ...If this
were not a case in which we are required . , . to give full faith
and credit,... we would, nevertheless, be required to recognize the
legislative enactments of California and the judicial acts of the
Superior Court ...as a matter of comity." s
For the sake of consistency and clarity of reasoning it would have
been better for the court had it stopped its opinion at that point. Having
stated that the public policy of the state was not injured by giving effect
to the California appointment, more than enough would have been said.
Since a doubt remained as to the future settlement of the estate of
Zetterlund, the court felt compelled to go on to explain that the faith
and credit extended only to the period of guardianship and not to the
time after the death of the ward. 49
STATE LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Erie Doctrine.-Cases during the period under survey have not dealt
with the classic Erie situation'5" frequently; rather they have gone off
into the area of difficult decision posed by the absence of "state law" to
147. 68 So.2d 604, 609 (Fla. 1953).
148. Ibid. The court cites Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539 (1926),
1 SUr. FLA. L. 224 at note 75, for the quotation approved as the alternative ground
for the decision in the principal case,
149. Nothing can be gained by delineating the inconsistency of this present opinion
with the rationale of the decision of the 9th circuit in Nelson v. Miller, 201 F.2d 277(9th Cir. 1952), which will be found at 68 So.2d 610, 611 (1953). The reader
can draw his own conclusions from reading the cases. justice Hobson must have had
the refrain "full faith and credit" on his mind when he wrote this opinion, for havingjust cited the decision of another court denying faith and credit, he said:
If we adhere to this doctrine as established by the said Federal decision, then
we are required to give full faith and credit to the procedings . . .which
took place during the period of the guardianship administration. Id. at 611.
The rule of this case has been given legislative sanction in Laws of Fla., e. 29892
(1955) amending FLA. STAT. § 732.26 (1953), so that no property passes to a
ersonal representative of a Florida decedent until after local probate of the will;
Iut a companion statute, c. 29893 amending FLA. STAT. § 733.01 (1953), flies in
the face of all established doctrines. Its provisions would involve Florida in an "Isle
of Tobago" situation in that it commands the personal representative to "take
possession of the personal property wheresoever situate" of a Florida decedent. On
the Isle of Tobago situation, see Briggs, The 'Legislative-Jurisdictional' Principle, 4 IrrT'L
& ComP. L.Q. 329, 340 (1955). For further discussion, see Recent Legislation. supra.
150. For an explanation -of the normal amplitude of state law in the diversity
situation, see 1 Suav. FLA. L. 231, especially note 119 at 234. See also Cheatham,
Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VANn. L. REV. 581 (1953).
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be applied in the federal court, or the encounter with applicability of state
law in a non-diversity situation.
Macarages v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co."'5 is the closest to the
classic situation. It involved the question whether workers in statutory1 2
hazardous occupations were covered by the Florida Workmen's Com-
pensation Act' 3 or had a distinct status allowing them to sue as at
common law. Appellants urged the position that the Compensation con-
tract fell within the prohibition of Florida Statute Section 769.06 of the
earlier act and that, "in the absence of a decision by the Supreme Court
of Florida covering the precise point .. .*1"4 they should not be deprived
of the right to sue for negligence. The trial court rejected this argument,
and in affirming, the Court of Appeals stated:
Any doubt as to the correctness of the judgment . . must
now, it seems to us, be completely swept away by the language
of the Florida Supreme Court in Winn-Lovett Tampa, Inc. v.
Murphree . . . "The contract of employment under the Work-
men's Compensation Act is statutory and the act is implicit ...
irrespective of the nature of the employment . . .,,"'
Passing now to the cases that dealt with the application of the Erie
technique in the absence of clear or decisive state authorities, the first
case is Murray v. G.F.C. Corp.' 6 Herein was involved the question of
priority of lien in chattels between an unrecorded mortgage and a general
creditor of the mortgagor. The mortgagee had not complied with the
statute granting priority against general creditors with notation. 17  The
lower court held that there was no reason to construe the statute granting
priority as destroying the former rule generally obtaining under other
recording acts of the state: "that the lien of an unrecorded mortgage is
prior in right to the rights of a general creditor who has not obtained a
lien upon the mortgaged property."'58
The court further held:
The district judge in a diversity case has so construed the
statute, and, in the absence of authoritative decisions of the Florida
courts construing it to the contrary, we are of the opinion that
the construction given it by the district judge was the correct
one.1 9
151. 220 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1955).
152. FLA. STAT. § 769 (1953).
153. FLA. STAT. § 440 (1953).
154. 220 F.2d 891 at 893 (5th Cir. 1955).
155. Id. at 894.
156, 214 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1954).
157 FLA. STAT. § 319.27(2) (1953). For a discussion of the effect of this
statute cf. section on interests in tangible chattels, infra, note 211.
158. 214 F.2d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 1954).
159. Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
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This technique, previously referred to as "the construction of the
state law" method, 1 0 was applied in the second circuit in the following
fashion. In a case involving rights of a third party in a surety bond,' 6 '
the court first localized the problem with this language:
The record shows that the defendant Casualty Company
was an Illinois corporation, that its principal-the subcontractoi--
was a Vermont corporation, and that the prime contractor was a
Massachusetts corporation, and that the subcontract was one to
be performed in Vermont. There is nothing in the record to
show that the parties . . .contemplated . . . that it was to be
interpreted or governed by the law of any particular state.
Accordingly, we think the problem presented should be determined
by the law of Vermont.1 2
Having achieved this result the court then goes on to state:
However, there seems to be neither statute nor judicial
precedent in Vermont bearing on this problem. And the problem
presented has been variously decided in various jurisdictions. Con-
fronted with this dilemma our task is not to surmise which line
of judicial precedent a Vermont court would follow . . . but
rather .. . to define the pertinent law which when thus ascer-
tained is presumably the law of Vermont even though as yet un-
announced by a Vermont Court."13
The Erie technique was also applied by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in a quasi non-diversity situation. The case of Johnson
160. 1 SURv. FA. L. 234 (1953).
161. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 219 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.
1955).
162. Id. at 647. If the reader wants to test the validity of Brigg's policy-centered
choice of law, see 4 INT'L & CoMP. L.P. at 333 ff, on this set of facts. Consider also
the fact that the court relied on Erie v. Tompkins as authority for what it does, and
then did not even mention the terms of its reference to Vermont law, except to
demonstrate the futility of the reference in the passage next quoted. Cf. conclusions
in note. 68 HARv. L. Rav. 1212, 1222-24 (1955),
163. Ibid. For this astounding proposition the court, composed of Clark, Frank
and Hincks, JJ., relies on MOORE COMMENTARY 338-40 (1949).
In another recent federal decision, Zaccar v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 50
(D.C.Mo. 1955), state law is made specifically applicable by the built-in choice of law
clause, of a federal statute. In this case, the court followed the line of reasoning expressed
in Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (bl, 2674 (1952). The liability of
the United States is determined by the law (?) of the place where the act or
omission occurred (Maryland). The statute in question does not classify the right to
contribution but, while there are arguments in favor of a uniform national rule, this
court preferred to apply the analogy of the Erie doctrine and made this right depend
on "local substantive law." Id. at 51.
"As in diversity cases involving similar questions, we nust 'apply the substantive
law of the state and the procedural law of the federal courts'. Cray v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. D.C.W.D. La., 31 F. Supp. 299, 306." Ibid. The court goes on to
state that "The Court of Appeals of Maryland has never passed flatly on the
question .... .Id. at 52. In fact the court adds: "I have never heard of such an
action being filed in Maryland . . . ." Id.
But the court nevertheless found a federal case that has reached the same conclusion
and sufficient authority to forecast that the Maryland law will be that contribution
cannot exist because of a failure of the rifht of an unemaucipated infant to sue its
parent for damage resulting from the parent s negligence.
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v. Remy 1 4 was an action in interpleader where no diversity of citizenship
existed. Whether the Erie doctrine is applicable where this is the founda-
tion for the federal jurisdiction was an open question,8 5 but the court
simply stated:
The federal district court sitting in Florida must conform
to the conflict of laws rule prevailing in Florida state courts. [Foot-
note omitted] Under that rule, the distribution of the proceeds
of the insurance policy is governed by the law of the State of
Florida; indeed, both parties agree that Florida law is con-
trolling. 6
It would be enlightening to know which of the many parts of the
conflict of laws the court has reference to when it states "that rule," and
also what conceivable effect the agreement of the parties has on measuring
the federal jurisdiction and the law applicable therein.' e After a lengthy
consideration of an apparently irreconcilable confusion of cases at the state
level, the court reached this conclusion:
We now find ourselves in agreement with Judge DeVane that,
since the ruling of the Supreme Court of Florida in In re Seaton's
Estate (18 So.2d 20) is the latest decision of that court on the
question purely of state law, it is controlling on the federal
courts.10
Another variation on the Erie theme, and this a very self-satisfactory
one in the increasingly popular game of who makes the state law, is to be
found in Martin v. Theockary.'"9 Here jurisdiction was apparently based
on diversity, thus full Erie treatment was afforded, as can be seen from the
opening sentence of the opinion:
The sole question on this appeal is whether, under Florida
law, . . . 170 a co-employee could be sued for damages within the
"third person exception" of the workmen's compensation law.171
At the time of the argument of the case before us, there was no
Florida case on the precise point. .. . We therefore undertook to
164. 220 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1955).
165. But cf., the contrary conclusion that interpleader is merely a remedial extension
of the diversity jurisdiction, 68 HARV. L. Rxv. 1224.
166. Supra note 164, at 74. In the omitted footnote in the opinion, numbered
4, the court cites Glaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941), see 1 SURv. FtA. L. 240
and note 144 (1953), discussing the scope of this part of the Erie rule, and Tucker
v. Texas, 204 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1953) as authority for this proposition.
167. Since the court seems to have disposed of the case in a non-conflict area.
no discussion of the apparently sound construction of the Florida law as it then existed
is included.
168. 220 F.2d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1955). The legislature was apparently unsatisfied
with the decision in the instant case or the interpretation of Seaton's Estate because it
enacted Laws of Fla., c. 29861 (1955), which added a further proviso to FLA, STAT.
§ 222.13 (1953), therein construed, making insurance payable to the insured or his
executors, administrators or assigns pass to the personal representative in the event he
died intestate or left a will which did not specifically bequeath the proceeds of any
such policy. Cf., the statement in the principal case 220 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1955).
169. 220 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1955).
170. Ibid.
171. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(1) (1953).
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'assume the duty the Supreme Court of Florida would have if the
case were before it, to state the proper interpretation of the
amended statute.' Holliday v. Wade, 5 Cir., 117 F. 2d 154, 156.
However, before our opinion was printed, we find that, subsequent
to argument, the Florida Supreme Court has now decided in
Franz v. McBee Company, 77 So. 2d 796 (1955)172 precisely as
the district court did in this case. Since we, of course, are bound
to follow the state law in construing such a Florida statute, it is un-
necessary for us to add our reasoning to the excellent treatment of
the question by the Florida Supreme Court. 178
Once again one is driven to the generalization that the Federal courts
are not paying sufficient heed to the proper scope to be given the state law
in the diversity and quasi-diversity situation. The failure on the part of
the Supreme Court of the United States to protect the existing national
forum is perhaps as much responsible for this state of affairs as any single
thing. The abandonment of the diversity forum to state law has carried
with it much former national law; the process of fragmentation of the
federal judicial power does not serve well the ends of the nation.
Federal law in the state courts.- Several different uses of federal law
were made by the Florida courts during the period under survey. Respect,
similar to that shown the same statute14 in Chambers v. Loftin, noted in
the previous Survey, 175 was given in Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., v.
Strickland.176 In reversing the judgment rendered below in favor of the
employee, and ordering entry of judgment for the employer the court
stated:
In cases arising under the Act in question, this court is required
to determine questions relating to the negligence of the employer
in accordance with the principles of law established and applied
by the Federal courts."'
172. This case must be noted for the other extremely interesting jurisdictional
question which it decided and which is not adverted to as being immaterial to the
ecision of the principal case. The court also decided that failure of a foreign corporation
to qualify to do business in the state under Section 613 did not deprive its Workmen's
Compensation contract of validity and thereby give the corporation the protection of
that statute. This result was achieved by placing the contract under the protection
of FLA. STAT. § 613.04 (1953), see 7 So.2d 796, 797 (1942). Thus even though
not fully present within the jurisdiction, legislatively or otherwise, the corporation has
capacity to act to this extent.
173. 220 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1955). For another case where it was necessary
to construe state law in the absence of state authority, see Continental Casualty Co.
v. Padgett, 123 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.S.C. 1954). Here the court quoted with approval
the formula of Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), to the
effect that the court must construe "with the aid of such light as was . . . at hand
and in accordance with the applicable principles for determining state law." A divining
rod might do as well! For another Eric case see, Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. DeMayo,
222 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1955).
174. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939) 45 U.S.C. § 51(1952.175 . See 1 Suny. FLA. L. 235 (1953). For an improper use of the cited case
as authority in a state law situation to which it was not applicable, see the reliance
of Mr. Justice Hobson, dissenting in Burdette v. Phillips, 76 So.2d 805, 811 (Fla. 1954).
176. 80 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1955).
177. Id. at 916.
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And in concluding its judgment, it made this statement:
So long as the Congress of the United States, by its lawful
Acts, requires proof of negligence on the part of the railroad
company before it can be held responsible . . . , just so long
must we require strict adherence .. .to the common-law concept
of negligence .... 178
The second use of federal law is a novel one but one that will grow
in frequency with the further need for construction of the new Florida
rules. In Carpineta v. Shields"7 9 the court turned to construction of an
identical federal rule for solution of its problem. It made this statement;
Rule 43 is identical with Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure .. . .While there are no Florida cases in point, the
majority rule in respect to Federal Rule 56 is stated in Hennessey
v. Federal Security Adm'r, ... 110
The court cited a large number of other federal cases and reached
a decision based on that rule.
In Cadieux v. Cadieux,8' W brought a bill in the nature of a bill
of review to set aside a divorce granted H on the ground of fraud in the
procurement. H, a member of the armed forces, had moved below for
a stay of proceedings under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.1 82
This was denied, and H appealed from the decree for W. The sole
question was whether the trial court had abused its discretion in denying
the stay; for the solution the court turned to the act 83 and the con-
struction thereof by the federal courts. Guided by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Boone v. Lightner'8 4 the court affirmed the decree
finding that there had been no abuse of discretion which properly was
lodged in the trial court under the federal rule. 85
178. Id. at 917. A similar respect was given in Martin v. Johnston, 79 So.2d 419(Fla. 1955), to the intent of Congress and the federal cases construing that intent in
defining the word "car" as used in the Safety Appliance Acts, 36 STAT. 298 (1910)
45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1952).
179. 70 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1954).
180. Id. at 574.
181. 75 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1954).
182. 54 STAT. 1178 (1940), 50 U.S.C. § 501, Appendix (1952).
183. In the instant case section 521 provided that action "shall . . . be stayed
unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of [the service man] to .. .conduct
his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service." This same
language is quoted by the court, 78 So.2d 700, 702.
184. 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
185. It is important to note that, presumably relying on the authority of these
cases and pursuing his continuing desire to raise the ethical level of conduct of divorce
cases in his court, Giblin, J. has reached a similar result in Strickland v. Strickland,
Ch. No. 175514, lth Judicial Circuit 1955. In that case, husband sued his wife
for divorce in Missouri and when the wife sued for the same relief in Florida, the
husband moved for a stay of proceedings under the act; it was granted. A master was
appointed by the court to investigate the bona fides of the parties and protect the
interest of the absent defendant. When it was discovered that the husband had
proceeded to decree in Missouri, the court vacated the stay and granted the wife
relief and custody of the child in the Florida proceeding. This case has importance,
therefore, in determining the question of double jurisdiction, comity and priority of
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The Erie doctrine and the federal-question jurisdiction.-In the first
Survey article mention was made of this emergent problem in two different
aspects.110 The first was to bring to the attention of the legal profession
that area in which both federal and state legal standards may be applicable
in a single case in either jurisdiction-the federal diversity (including the
non-diversity already subsumed under this rubric) or the state. The second
was the mention of a possible new category of substance-procedure classifica-
tion for the federal question; federal jurisdiction which would not involve
either a mere mimicing of the Erie doctrine or a retrogression to the
"federal common law" of Swift v. Tyson.
The first case 87 to throw light on this difficult area arose, in the period
under survey, in the state courts. It involved the interaction of a con-
tractual limitation of action contained in a bill of lading of an interstate
shipper' 88 and a remedial provision contained in a state statute of limita-
tions."89 The court was divided on the question of whether the federal
law had pre-empted the field so as to preclude the state remedial measure.
The uniform express receipt provided two years and a day after notice
of denial of claim in which to commence an action against the carrier.
Shipper's action, which had been reversed'" above, had been so com-
menced, but the new action had not, although within the one year proviso
of the state law.
The court admitted that the Carmack and Cummins amendments
as construed by the Supreme Court "withdrew" questions of validity of
stipulations from the state field. But, said the majority, only to the extent
of invalidating any stipulations providing for a period shorter than that
provided in the Federal law. At this point the majority opinion stated:
The history and development of the interstate commerce act
has been set forth . . . to point up the fact that the Congress has
not yet seen fit to enact into law a statute of limitations against
an interstate carrier by a shipper . . . The United States Supreme
determination, and it is hoped that it will be reported, as was the decision of the
same judge in another amicus curiae appointment in a divorce case, Levine v. Levine,
6 Fla. Supp. 54 (1954), as well as his decision noted in the prior Survey, see comment
on l3urkman v. Taran (Law No. 28594-H, 11 Judicial Circuit, 1953, 1 Suv. FLA. L.
237 (1953), note 133 and on the work of the Florida Supplement, id at 238 and note
134. The Burkman case can now be found in 4 Fla. Supp. 182 (1953).
186. 1 Surv. FLA. L. 239 (1953) especially note 135 and the final paragraph of
the text on p. 235.
187. Hoagland v. Railway Express Agency, 75 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1954), noted
in 9 MIAMi L.O. 226 (1955). The court split 4-3 with the majority opinion by
Roberts, then C.. The late C.J. Mathews, Sebring and Thomas dissented, opinion
by Mathews, id. at 828, 831.
188. The principle provision in question is found in 54 STAT. 916 (1940) 49
U.S.C. § 20(11) (1952).
189. FLA. STAT. § 95.06 (1953). It provided that a plaintiff, who had ajudgment reversed in a higher court, might have one year from such reversal in which
to commence a new action.
190. But not on the merits, see the statement in 75 So.2d 822. 823: for previous
opinion, see Railway Express Agency v. Hoagland, 62 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1952).
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Court has often said that in those fields of commerce where
national uniformity is not essential, either the state or federal
government may act.191
Finding that there is no requirement of uniformity here and no clear
conflict or inconsistency of the provisions in question, the court goes on
to state:
\Ve are cognizant of our duty to adhere to the decisions of
the Suprene Court of the United States . . but counsel have cited
no decision of that court . . . in which the facts arc so similar
as to make such a decision binding on this court. -
The majority attempted to bolster their position by classifying the
statute in question as remedial. This is not done in the technical conflict
sense but rather by indirection to hint that similar "remedial" statutes
classify the second action as a continuation of the former action.', 3  In
view of the congressional mandate, the court could not have taken the
direct conflict approach of excluding the federal norm by classifying the
element as procedural (another term for remedial) and governable by state
law. This, however, is the effect of the holding.
In another indirect brush with the science of conflicts, which the
court appears to avoid as a technical discipline, the court looks to the
law of New York, "the place where the'instant contract was made,"'1 4 to
find a similar remedial statute to Section 95.06 and borrows that jurisdic-
tion's construction of that statute making it applicable to contractual
limitations. No explanation of the use of any logic, other than that given
by common sense and normal legal training, is evidenced in the balance
of the opinion. In this last situation, use of choice of lav techniques
could have added considerably to the strength of an otherwise not overly
convincing judicial utterance.
Brief mention must be made of another dual-jurisdiction situation
before concluding this discussion. In Cox v. Roth' 95 the Supreme Court
of the United States decided several questions having a-bearing on matters
just discussed in the preceding part of this section. Suit was brought
under the Jones Act'96 and the question was whether action would survive
the death of the tort-feasor. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held' 9 ' in the negative on the question under the Federal act, but allowed
191. Id. at 825.
192. Ibid. This nothwithstanding that a bare minority of the same court found
decisions so pursuasive as to render an almost cavalier dismissal of the maiority's
position. See especially id. at 829 and the attitude of the same court in Henderson v.
State, 65 So.2d 22, 25 (1953) quoted at 830.
193. 75 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1954). See particularly statements made at page 827.
194. Ibid.
195. 348 U.S. 218 (1954).
196. More particularly 41 STAT. 988 (1920); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
197. 210 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1954).
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recovery under Florida law. Relying on the "welfare" intent of Congress
and analogyzing from the corporate survival provisions of the FELA,
which marked the general limits of seamens' rights under this act, the
court allowed survival. On the final point, of analogical importance to the
discussion of the Hoagland case, supra, it made this statement:
Petitioners make the further claim that . . . , this suit must
fail because petitioner did not comply with the Florida statute
governing the distribution of decedent estates. The short answer
to this is that Congress, within its constitutional power, decreed
a 3-year statute of limitations uniformly throughout the Nation
. . . and no state statute can diminish this period.'"
SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE
State law.-Two recent cases have thrown considerable doubt "9 on the
continuing validity of a statement made in the prior Survey. Both involved
the enforceability of Florida judgments in Kentucky. In the state court,
Ley v. SimmonsOu decided that, where a Florida judgment was still valid
under the twenty year Florida limitation, suit was barred by the Kentucky
fifteen year limitation which had run. This was decided notwithstanding
a local statute which gave validity to foreign judgments as long as they
were not barred by the limitation of the rendering state. In a similar
action in the federal court, 05 the same result was reached apparently on
the basis of a classification of the state rule as "substantive" for the federal
courts sitting in diversity. In rationale, both cases relied on the strong
holding of the Supreme Court in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co. 20 2
Federal law.-As pointed out in the discussion of the Erie rule, a new
classification as to substance and procedure in the federal courts must
now be made for those cases arising in the federal question jurisdiction.
198. 348 U.S. 207 (1954).
199. The doubt is only partial since the statement was: ."Th e foreign courts
construing the Florida statutes tof limitation] have normally held them to be sub-
stantive." 1 Suv. FLA. L. at 240 (1953). The cases noted in the present text did
not involve only the construction of the Florida statutes but the classification made
was quite clear and undermined the statement made.
200. - Ky. - , 249 S.W.2d 808 (1952).
201. Albanese v. Ohio River-Frankfort Cooperage Corp., 125 F. Supp. 333
(W.D.Ky. 1954).
202. 345 U.S. 514 (1953). rhis decision was rendered in the analogous field
of faith and credit to causes of action arising under sister-state statutes which are
now assumed to be suhject to the same strictness of respect as that to be accorded
to judgments in the cases now being commented upon. See discussion of Hughes v,
Fetter, 1 SuRv. FLA. L. 236 (1953); see also extension of the doctrine in First National
Bank v, United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952). The Wells case established the
rule, similar to that in the text, that the forum could apply its own time limitation
to the death statute of a sister state even though that statute contained a longer period
of limitaion. For a discussion of the same procedural classification of a statute of
limitation (this one foreign international) see Bournias v. Atlantic Marine Co.,
220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955) and an excellent discussion of the former distinction
between statutes "barring the right" and "barring the remedy" in note to Bournias
in 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 558 (1955).
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Two very fine contributions203 have been made to recent legal literature
on the precise point raised in two bankruptcy cases decided in the years
now under survey. Bruce v. McClure'04 was an action by the trustee in
bankruptcy of a corporation against the president of said corporation and
his wife, to have payments by the corporation on a mortgage set aside and
held a pro tanto purchase by the corporation. The reference seems to
have been in terms of governing the entire question by forum law, in this
case Florida law. The opinion considers exclusively the Florida law of
estates by the entireties and the Florida rule that even an integrated con-
tract may be modificd by subsequent parol. The court made no state-
ments as to the scope of, or reason for, the reference to state law.- 5
In M. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas2t 06 there occurred a similar applica-
tion of state law in a bankruptcy proceeding. Again there is no formal
explanation of the reasons for applying state law.207  The court's main
conclusion is:
. . . that an assignment of a claim against the Covernment
not conforming to the statute,208 but after the issuance of war-
rants, is valid against a bankruptcy receiver if it is perfected
according to local law and otherwise meeting the tests of s.60,
sub. a of the Bankruptcy Act.200
On the facts of the instant case, the court found that the assignment
conformed to the requirements of a pledge under Florida law in that it
was not the type of instrument requiring conformity to the Florida
statute.210 The case was, however, remanded for trial on the issue of
voidable preference.
203. The first, a superb job of pioneering by Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy,
66 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1953) and the later useful note, Applicability of State
Conflicts Rules When Issues of State Law Arise its Federal Question Cases, 68 HAv.
L. REv. 1212 (1955). The scope of the latter article is much broader than merely
the bankruptcy question; see conclusion, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1228-29.
204. 220 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1955).
205. Cf. statement in note, supra note 203,
In suits by a bankruptcy or reorganization trustee the enforcement of a
state-created cause of action, taken together with the existence of concurrentjurisdiction, justifies a Klaxon result. Id. at 1228.
206. 221 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1955).
207. In a third case, Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955) such a
policy of limiting the use of state law to a minimum was followed. The case also
contains, at 396, one of the pioneer discussions of characterization in the conflict
of laws. While the particular result is blurred by considering the decision as having
the same outcome whether made according to federal or Florida law, the problem
has been recognized. Further comment will be made in the next survey article, particularly
with regard to the statements made in note 9 of the opinion, at 398, which raises
the ghost of renvoi in this new field; also in note 13, ibid., containing the statement,
"Since uniformity of result is the basic object of Conflict of Laws ..... Cf. 1 Suav.
F.A. L. at 209 (1953).
And the type of action, under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, would seem to
furnish less basis for such a reference.
208. The Federal Assignment of Claims Act., 54 STAT. 1029 (1940); 31 U.S.c.
§ 203 (1952d
209.121 F.2d. 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1955).
210. The Florida Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act., FLA. STAT. §§ 524.01-09
(1953).
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It is difficult to explain the results of either of these cases in terms
of a fixed policy. Where the federal question jurisdiction attaches, or even
where the scope of process differs drastically as in the quasi-diversity
jurisdiction in interpleader, and especially where federal policy is involved,
the use of state law, whole or conflict, should be kept to a minimum.
CHOICE oE LAW
Creation and transfer of interests in tangible chattels.-The statutory law
with regard to that most important "tangible and mobile chattel" has not
been changed since the prior Survey. The doctrine of the McQueen-
Livingston cases 21' has been adhered to.
In Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 12 a Georgia automo-
bile with a duly recorded interest of the conditional vendee was brought
into Florida without the latter's consent. The original conditional vendor
sold it to X who obtained a Florida certificate of title; X then sold it to
used-car dealer I who sold it to used-car dealer 2. It was argued that the
purchasers after X were innocent and without notice and should have an
interest superior to GMAC. The court affirmed the superiority of the
lien of the conditional vendee on the authority of the McQueen-Livingston
doctrine. In addition, it was pointed out that the original Florida title,
by law,2 13 carried an indication of the prior foreign registry. This destroyed
the innocence of any subsequent purchaser and the duty of inquiry imposed
by Florida Statute Section 319.27(3) (f) runs with the title, even though
it might have been thought to cover only the first purchaser. This salutory
holding will aid in discouraging the flight of automobiles to jurisdictions
where titles can be "washed out" and then reintroduced into Florida-an
ever increasing threat to the sound lender of money on this ubiquitous
chattel.
This extended doctrine was later applied in a case 214 where the pur-
chaser attempted to defeat the effect of Section 319.27 by pointing out
that under the law of creation of the interest (Missouri) a subsequent
mortgage containing a correct description was held to prevail over a prior
mortgage containing an incorrect description. The attempt failed because
both the original title on which purchaser based his claim and the instru-
ment creating the lien contained the identical incorrect description. As
was pointed out in the prior Survey,215 this result seems very sound. The
policy is designed to protect diligent purchasers and is based on an extension
of the doctrine of comity to foreign created interests. Thus, if the original
211. For comment and citations see I SURM. FLA. L. 241 ff. The statute, FLA.
STAT. § 319, was not affected in any substantial way by the Laws of 1955.
212. 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954).
213. FLA. STAT. § 319.23(4)(1953).
214. Clinger v. Reliable Discount Co., 80 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1955).
215. But see the questions still left open which were raised in note 160, 1 Smv.
FLA. L. 244 (1953).
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lien-holder by his negligence permits a diligent purchaser to be misled,
he should suffer the same los as the careless purchaser does under the
McQueen doctrine.2 16  What is negligence on the part of the lien-holder
is properly measured by the law under which the lien was created.217
Creation of interests-intangibles.-Two cases in the period under survey
dealt with the question of the law applicable to changes in interests in
intangibles, although neither discussed these matters as being technically
within the conflict of laws. In the first, Weissman v. Lincoln Corp.,218
shares of stock had been issued subject to a valid shareholders' agreement
which was indicated on the face of the shares. The court held that the
restrictions on alienation of this stock survived a foreign foreclosure
proceeding and that, at the foreclosure sale, the pre-emptive rights of the
shareholders to release this stock by satisfying the debt on default were
paramount to those of the purchaser.
The court stated, after discussing the general validity of such options:
• .. it is plain that in the present case neither the corporation
nor the stockholders were made parties to the New York proceed-
ings under which the pledged stock was sold and no notice was
ever given . . . Consequently they were not given the right
which the law contemplates to protect themselves . . .by bidding
at the sale. Under these facts we think the court below was
correct in ruling . . . that by so purchasing he took the stock
subject to such restrictions as were contained in the agreement
and merely became subrogated to the rights of the pledgee .... 29
What the court failed to clarify is what is meant by use of the
word "law" in the paragraph quoted. Some indication was given, in a
rather general fashion, that New York law is indicated by the language
which stated that appellant suffered nought since the stockholders got no
more than they would have had they participated in the New York
proceeding and the appellant had not shown that he is getting anything
less. Thus, in place of a scientific discussion of the proper law applicable,
we are told that "it cannot be assumed that the terms of the decree are
inequitable in this respect." 220
216. Quoted with approval by the court, 80 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1955).
217 The rationale of this statement is based on the quotation from Lee v. Bank
of Georgia to be found in 1 SUn. FLA. L. at 242 (1953). Murray v. G.F.C. Corp.,
214 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1954) should be mentioned here because it involved the
analogous problem of non-conflict priority of liens in automobiles. It is discussed
more fully in the section on state law in the federal courts, supra note 150 and the
related text.
218. 76 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1954).
219. Id. at 483 relying on Reichert Y. Appel, supra note 118. The court also
found that the notice more than satisfied the requirements of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, FLA. STAT. § 614.17 (1953) without bothering to consider that New
York law might be applicable.
220. Ibid.
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The second case was Wright v. Board of Public Instruction2 ' in which
the court held that a purchaser from a Maryland bank of time warrants
of the board, where the bank had notice of lack of consideration for the
full face value after its original lien attached, was only free of personal
defenses to the extent of that lien. The court applied the Florida law
of negotiable instruments to the transfer,22 2 while noting that the rights
of a holder in due course through a holder in due course were created by
a transfer in another jurisdiction. Similarly it said "that these derivative
rights inure to a purchaser after maturity, see United States v. Bryant,
D.C.Fla., 58 F.Supp. 663, affirmed 5 Cir., 157 F.2d 767."'223 It further
limited the rights of the foreign transferee to those which would inure
under Florida law. While no criticism of the result is intended, some
authority might have been cited.
CONCLUSION
In concluding this survey, mention should once again be made of
current and choice writings which have contributed to the general de-
velopment of the field. No attempt is made to list all of the articles,
notes and comments, even though they have not been as numerous in
the past two years as formerly, but only to list certain ones that are felt
to have special importance for the Florida student, teacher or practitioner.
Bayitch has made two outstanding contributions, The Connecting Agree-
ment224 and Conflict Law in United States Treaties.225 Yntema has con-
tinued his study, which it is to be hoped will soon appear as a treatise,
with his usual brilliance and charm in Contract and Conflict of Laws:
"Autonomy" and Choice of Law in the United States.228 Full Faith and
Credit for Judicial Proceedings by Summer is an excellent review of this
always interesting field.227
Several references have been made to the latest in the series by Prof.
Briggs, and the following article is of further interest: "Legislative-Jurisdic-
tional Principle" in a Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws.228 And another in
221. 77 So.2d. 435 (Fla, 1955), reversing, 4 Fla. Supp. 178 (1953).
222. FLA. STAT. §§ 674.30 and 674.00 (1953).
223. 77 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1955).
224. 7 MIArs L.Q. 293 (1953), The appearance of the same article rewritten
especially for the Civil-audience as La Autonomia de im Partes en la Eleccion del
Derecho Applicable a los Contratos, 7 Bo., INsT. DER. CoMP. (Mexico) 41 (1954),
is one of the happiest by-products of our Inter-American Law Program to date. See
also comment on both articles in Yntema, infra note 227, at 63.
225. 8 MIAMI L.Q. 501 (1954), 9 id. at 9, 125.
226. I N.Y. LAw FORUM 46 (1955). Citation of this new law review cannot
be let to pass without special mention. It is a fine addition to our national juridical
scene and its excellence a just tribute to the school that publishes it.
227. 2 U.C.L.A. LAw REV. 441 (1955).
228. 4 INT'l. & CoMP. L.Q. 329 (1955). At the same time mention shoudd be
made of two notes appearing in the same review, Kennedy, Recognition of Foreign
Divorces: the Effect of Travers v. Holley, id. at 389 and Braybooke, New Zealand:
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the excellent series of Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in its Historical
Perspective, 12 to conclude this brief summary on the thought-provoking
level of which that writer is so eminently capable.2 30
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, 1953, id. at 209. It is not usual
to make comments on the articles listed in this section but in the case of Briggs's
the temptation to make one observation cannot be resisted. At 340 the author
states that he agrees with L. Hand and Yntema "that conflicts under our Constitution
generally should be models for international situations." Cf. also his note 45 ibid.
How, without the superior power of the Supreme Court to enforce a unified concept
of "governmental interest," would this be achieved? If, as stated, the "Isle of Tobago"
may in certain circumstances govern most, if not all, of the world, to what organ
or which body would Briggs have us look to fix the limits?
229. 103 U. PA. L. REv. 133 (1954). Appropriately, in view of its predecessors
in series, see 1 Suav. FLA. L. 245 (1953), note 164, subtitled "Should the Restatement
Be 'Continued'." Two points are vital in Ehrenzweig's position. First, that the law
of conflicts should not at this time be frozen, and secondly, that no one abroad should
be misled by the exportation of the Restatement as prevailing international U.S. conflict
law. The time needed for translation presents an inevitable lag and the translator often
obtains a vested interest in imposing his efforts. On this latter danger see comment
by Briggs, op. cit. supra notes 141 and 228, at 355, and note 98. The growing
awareness of the need to separate interstate and international conflict rules is evidenced
by a panel discussion of the problem by a distinguished group of experts in New York,
May 1955 (copy furnished the author through the courtesy of Prof. Cheatham).
230. Tribute must be paid here to Mr. Justice Terrell. Since no other aficionado,
see 1 Suiv. FtA. L. 231 (1953), note 106, has appeared, there are listed herewith
some more "Terrellisms," especially Rue v. Rue, 72 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1954) where the
style of the case stirred the master to outdo himself; Kelly v. Kelly, 73 So.2d 829 (Fla.
1954); Halberstadt v. Halberstadt, 72 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1954); Tsapelas v. Tsapelas,
69 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1954), the marital caveat emptor rule: and, Heps v. Burdine's, Inc.,
69 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1954).
